Sir Keir Starmer traveled to Wales' northern region this past Thursday to announce the construction of a new nuclear power station. This is a significant policy event with implications at local and countrywide levels. Yet, the PM did not devote much time in Wales to advocating answers for the UK's energy needs. Instead, he used the time trying to draw a line under the Labour leadership briefing row, informing reporters that No 10 had not undermined the health secretary’s ambitions earlier this week.
As such, Sir Keir’s day served as a microcosm of what his prime ministership has now become more generally. On the one hand, he desires his administration to be performing, and to be seen to be doing, significant actions. On the other hand, he is unable to accomplish this due to the way he – and, partly, the nation more generally – now practices political and governmental affairs.
Sir Keir is unable to change the political culture on his own, but he can take action about his own role in it. The plain fact is that he could manage the centre of government far better than he does. If he did this, he might find that the nation was in less despair about his government than it is, and that he was communicating his points more successfully.
A number of the issues in Number 10 are about individuals. The interpersonal relations of any No 10 regime are hard to know accurately from the exterior. Yet it appears clear that Sir Keir does not make good personnel choices, or stick with them. Maybe he is overly occupied. Perhaps he is not really interested. However, he must to improve his performance, avoid slow progress or by halves.
All premiers devote excessive time overseas and on international matters, where Sir Keir should delegate more, and insufficient time talking to MPs and listening to the citizens. Prime ministers also spend too much time doing media, which Sir Keir worsens by performing inadequately. Yet leaders cannot express surprise when their political appointees, who tend to be party loyalists or politically ambitious, cross lines or become the focus, as the chief of staff now has.
The most significant problems, however, are systemic. It would be good to believe that Sir Keir read the a think tank's March 2024 report on overhauling the government's central operations. His inability to grip these issues in the summer or since implies he did not. The frequently dismal experience of the Labour administration suggests IfG proposals like reorganizing the roles of the Cabinet Office and Downing Street, and separating the jobs of top official and head of the civil service, are now urgent.
The political pre-eminence of prime ministers far outdistances the assistance provided to them. Consequently, all aspects suffer, and much is done badly or neglected.
This isn't Sir Keir’s fault alone. He is the casualty of past failures along with the author of current mistakes. Yet individuals who expected Sir Keir might get a grip on the core and take the machinery of government seriously have been disappointed. Sadly, the primary casualty from this failure is Sir Keir personally.